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Social actors operate under a basic imperative to construct explanations for the events that surround
them. Many issues that dominate the societal agenda today are not available to direct perception,
derive from traditionally expert domains and are relatively remote from immediate local experience.
This presents a challenge for lay explanation of these issues. Social representations theory offers a
useful framework through which the construction of lay explanation for such issues can be examined.
The current study recruited this theoretical framework to investigate lay explanations of the recent
economic recession in Ireland. Data consisted of semi-structured interviews with 14 members of
the public and a web-based survey (N=138). The data suggested that explanations for the recession
could be organised into three major themes: Power, Ordinary People and Fatalism. Strictly economic
explanations were eschewed; instead, people drew upon a wide range of ideas about society, politics,
morality, public spheres and personhood. The implications of these ﬁndings for understanding lay expla-
nation of contemporary social crises are discussed. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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The global ﬁnancial crisis that began in 2008 shook many societies to their core, none
more so than the Republic of Ireland where effects of the crisis were felt particularly
acutely. Between 1990 and 2007 — often characterised as the ‘Celtic Tiger’ era — Irish
economic output had quadrupled (Kelly, 2010). However, in autumn 2008, the combina-
tion of an international liquidity crisis and the collapse of Irish property prices led the ef-
fective failure of Ireland’s domestic banking sector, necessitating substantial government*Correspondence to: Cliodhna O’Connor, University College London, Division of Psychology and Language
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454 C. O’Connorbailouts. From 2008 to 2010, GNP contracted by 18% and unemployment rose from 5% to
14% (CSOI, 2010). In Ireland, the sharp descent into recession was met with bewilderment
on the part of the political and economic elite and the general public alike. It was clear that
the effects of the crisis were things for which the country was structurally, socially and
psychologically unprepared.Lay explanation of contemporary social crises
In a context of confusion engendered by such a crisis, people are motivated to construct
understandings that establish solid points of reference through which they can con-
ceptually adjust to the situation. Research indicates that search for explanation —
accounting for why the event happened— is stimulated by negative and unexpected events
(Försterling, 2001). Explaining social events is one of the central mechanisms through
which we orient ourselves to the world; Hume (1740/2007) described causal inference
as ‘the cement of the universe’ (p. 417). Gustav Ichheiser, one of the ﬁrst scholars to study
causal explanation systematically, was drawn to the topic by its social importance, writing
that the role of societies’ attributional processes in the lead-up to World War II was ‘hardly
possible to exaggerate’ (Ichheiser, 1949, p.47). People are called — implicitly as social
actors and explicitly as citizens — to explain the problems faced by society (Hewstone,
1989). The explanations produced have weighty implications, determining who is afforded
responsibility to deal with problems and what measures are deemed appropriate to do so.
Uncovering the lay epistemology of societal problems is therefore a critical task in under-
standing our social world.
For most laypeople, the process of explaining a crisis like economic recession is not
straightforward. Sociologists have characterised our age as one of constant impending
catastrophe, in which the threat of social, technological or environmental collapse is never
far from the agenda. This is theoretically embodied in the risk society thesis developed by
the sociologist Ulrich Beck (1992). While the resources of post-industrial society have
administered control over many of the hazards that blighted previous times, technological
advances have simultaneously spawned a new set of risks— like environmental pollution,
nuclear accidents and food contamination — that threaten our social order and material
existence and dominate the political landscape of Western societies. The problems typical
of the risk society are deﬁned by a number of distinctive features to which the recent
recession can be seen to conform. First, it was a global event that largely transcended
national boundaries. Second, economic processes are invisible and not available to
direct perception. Third, understanding its origin and development requires specialised
knowledge: people cannot see or directly experience phenomena like economic recession
and rely on experts to identify and characterise them. Fourth, it resulted from human
activities, but it is difﬁcult to pinpoint distinct groups or individuals to whom the problem
can be unambiguously attributed.
It is likely that these four features make the recession resistant to simple causal explana-
tion. Their effect is to remove the crisis from people’s everyday realities; it is not a matter
of local, immediate experience and must be conceptualised at an abstract rather than a
directly experiential level. When an issue is not available to direct experience or percep-
tion, the construction of its explanation must be a socially constituted process. Research
supports the pivotal role of the social in economic cognition: studies have identiﬁed social-
isation (rather than direct experience) as critical in the development of children’s economicCopyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Community Appl. Soc. Psychol., 22: 453–469 (2012)
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Lay explanation of contemporary social crises 455concepts (Bonn, Earle, Lea & Webley, 1999; Sévon & Weckström, 1989), and there
are large degrees of commonality in the economic concepts held by different individuals
(Leiser & Drori, 2005). As an individual cannot look into the world and directly perceive
a macro-economic process, the only way in which to ‘know’ the issue is through the
mediation of other people or institutions, including experts, media outlets and conversa-
tional partners. Understanding how lay explanation of economic crisis develops therefore
requires a theoretical framework in which the constitutive role of social context and
communication processes is central.Social representations theory
Such a framework is provided by social representations theory (SRT), a social psycholog-
ical theory designed to capture the shared, common-sense and everyday representations
through which people orient themselves to the world (Moscovici, 1988). SRT rejects the
individualistic approach to human thought that dominates much mainstream psychology
and shifts concern from knowledge as an individual property to knowledge grounded in
the intersubjective world of a community (Jovchelovitch, 2007). This makes it appropriate
for examining economic issues, independent explanation of which is not an option avail-
able to most people. SRT provides a lens through which one can track how social resources
are drawn upon in order to satisfy the imperative to explain events. Applications of SRT to
responses to public issues have proved fruitful in domains such as health (e.g. Jodelet,
1991; Joffe & Haarhoff, 2002) and science and technology (e.g. Bauer, 2009; Wagner &
Kronberger, 2001).
The social representational process is driven by people’s motivation to ‘know’ the world
around them by ‘making the unfamiliar familiar’ (Moscovici, 1961/2008). This develop-
ment of understanding is achieved through two processes. First, the new phenomenon is
anchored in phenomena with which the community is already familiar, and the meanings
attached to the familiar phenomena inﬂuence how the new phenomenon is represented
(Moscovici, 1988). The second process is objectiﬁcation, in which the initially abstract
new idea is concretized by grounding the representation in a tangible object, image or con-
cept. Bauer and Gaskell (1999) give the example of genetic engineering in the 1990s being
anchored in the idea of ‘cloning’ and objectiﬁed in the ﬁgure of ‘Dolly the sheep’. The rel-
evance of these processes for examining lay explanations of risk society crises like the
recession is that they provide a means by which the crises’ distinctly abstract nature can
be brought into the domain of immediate apprehension. Recruitment of these theoretical
concepts is therefore likely to offer signiﬁcant advantage in understanding how the reces-
sion has been comprehended by the public.
SRT is especially concerned with how knowledge that is produced in the ‘reiﬁed uni-
verse’ of science and expertise diffuses through society to the ‘consensual universe’ pop-
ulated by the general public, becoming transformed in the process. Thus, it acknowledges
the inﬂuence of expert evaluations in public representation, but does not assume that these
are simply transplanted intact into the minds of the populace. Expert pronouncements are
reframed, reconstituted and sometimes actively resisted (Jovchelovitch, 2008), and this
process is driven by meaningful social interests rather than individual cognitive biases.
Joffe, Washer and Solberg’s (2011) study examining public perceptions of the hospital
infection methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) found that the accepted
medical explanation for MRSA— antibiotic overuse— tended to be overlooked in favourCopyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Community Appl. Soc. Psychol., 22: 453–469 (2012)
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problems with the National Health Service. Thus, people do not approach a new issue with
a mental blank slate but through the lens of existing sets of worldviews and representa-
tions, resulting in explanations that incorporate a broader range of concerns than typically
found in decontextualised expert evaluations. An SRT approach allows these concerns to
emerge, thereby facilitating not just a picture of representations of the issue under direct
scrutiny, but establishing an insight into the wider concerns that structure people’s experi-
ence of speciﬁc social contexts.
As a framework, SRT represents a move away from the rationalistic tradition that dom-
inates much of psychology. Social representations are not ‘cold’ knowledge structures but
are underpinned by social and emotional motivations (Joffe, 2003). A central motivational
foundation of the social representational process is identity protection (Howarth, 2002).
The identity functions of social representations become particularly apparent when a com-
munity is confronted with a threatening phenomenon. Research indicates that in such a
case, the risk is often projected onto an ‘other’ or outgroup, thereby protecting the self
from blame or symbolic contamination. Joffe (1999) documents how at the height of the
HIV/AIDS epidemic, symbolisation of the disease as a ‘gay plague’ served to distance
the majority from the threat itself and from its associated social censure. SRT thus provides
a useful lens for exploring how the identity dynamics of a society feed into public reactions
to an impinging threat.
There seems to be a certain ﬁt between these dimensions of social representation and the
characteristics of risk society-type problems outlined earlier. Typical risk society issues
cannot be accessed through direct experience: explanations must be constructed socially,
the process of which is captured by SRT. The issues are invisible: they can be made tan-
gible through anchoring and objectiﬁcation processes. Further, they require specialised
knowledge: SRT explicitly designates a role for experts and authorities, but treats their pro-
nouncements as funnelled into a wider network of lay knowledge that is meaningful on
its own terms. Additionally, responsibility for their causation is ambiguous: the identity
dynamics of social representation may aid in resolution of this ambiguity. Social represen-
tation thus offers several means by which people can resolve the abstract nature of risk
society-type issues, representing them in such a way as to make them accessible to direct
apprehension.Social representations of the ﬁnancial crisis
SRT therefore appears to be an appropriate framework in which to locate explorations of
public reactions to the recent ﬁnancial crisis. This was recognised in studies by Leiser,
Bourgeois-Gironde and Benita (2010) and Roland-Lévy, Pappalardo Boumelki and Guillet
(2010), both of which applied SRT to analyses of public perceptions of the crisis. The
Leiser et al. (2010) study comprised a questionnaire completed by 1707 people in France,
the US, Russia, Germany, Israel and sub-Saharan Africa. Factor analysis revealed two ma-
jor conceptions of the crisis, one (the most pervasive) focusing on the role of morally or
cognitively ﬂawed individuals, and another relying on understandings of the economy as
a system largely independent from human intentions. Roland-Lévy et al. (2010) also
administered a questionnaire, asking 275 French participants to provide words or expres-
sions that they associated with the word ‘crisis’. People spontaneously associated the crisis
with ideas like economy, unemployment, difﬁculties and ﬁnances. The Leiser et al. (2010)Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Community Appl. Soc. Psychol., 22: 453–469 (2012)
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ings of the economic crisis. However, the reliance of both on questionnaire data means that
there is a limit to the depth of analysis possible. Participants were restricted to predeﬁned
response types, and a comprehensive depiction of the anchoring, objectiﬁcation and iden-
tity dynamics of the social representations is difﬁcult to formulate from this data.
The current study attempted to deepen analysis of social representations of the crisis by
recruiting qualitative interview methodology to explore lay explanations for Ireland’s eco-
nomic recession. Interviews allow people to contextualise and elaborate on their responses,
thereby facilitating not just the identiﬁcation of the particular ideas circulating in a society
but also observation of their meaning and function in particular social and emotional con-
texts. The study drew on interviews with 14 people. A survey of 138 people was also con-
ducted to provide conﬁdence that the themes identiﬁed in the interviews were present
among a wider population segment. The aim was to identify patterns present in Irish
people’s explanations of the recession in spring–summer 2010, a time when the issue
was paramount in the public agenda.INTERVIEWS
Method
Informants. Ten semi-structured individual interviews with Irish citizens were con-
ducted in locations across Ireland in April 2010. Potential informants were identiﬁed
through online advertisements and snowballing. Selection of informants was guided by
the aim of accessing a range of different population segmentations, so as to secure a variety
of perspectives and experiences (Gaskell, 2000). Table 1 lists the informants.
A group interview was also conducted to observe how the recession was discussed in a
more naturalistic social context (Gaskell, 2000). The interview transcripts were inspected
to identify an appropriate population from which to recruit participants. Several informants
mentioned recent university graduates in speaking about the recession’s consequences, but
to different purposes: some identiﬁed them as among the worst affected groups, while
others represented them as immune from the recession. It was thought that this variation
in representations of graduates might make them an interesting population of study. Four
people who had graduated in the previous two years (pseudonyms Aileen, Declan, Eoin
and Orla) agreed to take part.Table 1. Individual interview informants
Pseudonym Sex Age Occupation
Anne Female 27 Teacher
Barbara Female 49 Sales Assistant
Caroline Female 48 Disability Advocate
Frank Male 56 Construction Director
Kate Female 27 Student
Liam Male 40 Line Technician
Paul Male 50 School Principal
Robert Male 74 Agricultural Advisor (Retired)
Sean Male 39 Civil Servant
Tom Male 45 Programme Analyst
Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Community Appl. Soc. Psychol., 22: 453–469 (2012)
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in their homes. Interviews were semi-structured. A topic-guide of questions probing infor-
mants’ explanations for the recession was developed to guide the interviews. The inter-
views began by asking informants what they would position as the starting point of the
recession, and then asked them to recount its progress to the present date. Other questions
addressed perceptions of the causation of the crisis and its impact on the informants per-
sonally and on society in general. The topic guide was used ﬂexibly rather than prescrip-
tively, in order to allow informants to direct attention to areas not pre-empted by the
interviewer. Interviews lasted between 30 and 60minutes.
Analysis. The interview transcriptions were subjected to thematic analysis using
ATLAS.ti 6. Thematic analysis can be deﬁned as ‘a method for identifying, analysing
and reporting patterns (themes) within data’ (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 79). Initially, the
transcripts were read through several times, with any emerging ideas or questions noted
using the memo facility of ATLAS.ti. These notes were gradually developed into a coding
frame for the analysis. Codes were essentially descriptive labels that captured the immedi-
ate content of data segments. This coding frame was applied systematically to the data by
the researcher, with data segments ‘tagged’ with relevant codes. The content of each code
(i.e. the quotes and memos corresponding to it) was then examined with a view to broad-
ening the analytic focus to the level of themes. Relationships between the codes were con-
sidered, and codes addressing similar issues were grouped together to produce a set of
themes. These were reviewed and reﬁned to ensure that they were supported by sufﬁcient
data, clearly deﬁned, internally coherent and distinct from each other.
Results
The thematic analysis of the interview data identiﬁed three major themes underlying expla-
nations of the recession: Power, Ordinary People and Fatalism.
I. Power
Power inequalities. Understandings of the recession were heavily anchored in ideas
about how power operates. The data revealed a perception that power in Ireland is distrib-
uted unequally, and that this contributed to the economic crash. Power was represented as
concentrated within select groupings, at the expense of a chronically disempowered
general public. People questioned the democratic nature of Irish public life, seeing little
opportunity for the general public to participate or for their interests to be represented.
The constitution and the laws governing us are in the hands of very few people (. . .) People (. . .)
don’t see themselves as having a big input into democracy or government or anything like that.
(Robert)
Banker-Politician-Developer ‘triad’. The powerful were objectiﬁed using the concept
of a ‘triad’ of the banking, political and property development ﬁelds. This idea of a ‘triad’,
‘triumvirate’ or ‘triangle’ was repeatedly introduced and seemed to form the symbolic core
of representations of the recession.
Between the politicians, the banks and the developers — that triumvirate or whatever you call it,
the triangle of the three of them — the power that sat with them. (Sean)Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Community Appl. Soc. Psychol., 22: 453–469 (2012)
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the population. The three bodies were seen to be in a mutually beneﬁcial relationship, act-
ing in each other’s favour while disregarding the interests of the rest of the population.
They were positioned as responsible for the recession, and informants expressed resent-
ment that they were not taking a proportional share of its consequences.
There doesn’t seem to be payback for them like there’s payback for everyone else. (Paul)
Banks were particularly salient as the primary causal agent. The term ‘bankers’ seems to
have been invested with major symbolic meaning following the recession. When the terms
‘bankers’ or ‘the banks’were used, they seemed to be intended to communicate more than their
literal meaning and were laden with emotional connotations of contempt, anger and blame.
Again it comes back to the banks again for me, I don’t know why but it just does (. . .) I suppose I
see them as greedy and the ones behind it all. (Anne)
There was an element of ‘othering’ in the way the ‘triad’ was represented. A clear us-
them dynamic pervaded the manner in which people spoke about it. Representing these
sectors as ‘other’ and attributing blame to them could serve defensive purposes, removing
culpability from the self and ‘ordinary people like me’. It also points to a serious distrust
that those in power will behave responsibly or fairly.
It’s one rule for the wealthy in this country and there’s another rule altogether for the people in the
middle to lower class. (Barbara)
Traits of the powerful agents. Interrogation of the representations of the ‘triad’
revealed a number of traits attached to its participants. Informants repeatedly framed the
actions of the ‘triad’ in moral terms, judging their behaviour as morally corrupt. They were
seen as fundamentally motivated by self-interest and greed. In pursuit of their interests,
they were portrayed as intentionally deceiving the public.
If they’d had a bit more moral respect for their job and not just gone on these, you know, proﬁt-
gaining things. (Kate)
There was also an element of doubt as to the competence of the powerful to fulﬁl their
duties. They were represented as acting foolishly and without foresight, and several infor-
mants spoke disparagingly of their intellectual abilities.
They don’t have the expertise and the intelligence. (Caroline)
II. Ordinary People
Ordinary people’s responsibility. While those in powerwere the principal symbolic focus
of people’s explanations, there was also some reluctance to project all blame onto other parties.
There was a recurring sentiment that everybody must now contribute to Ireland’s recovery
efforts. This ‘collective hit’was sometimes portrayed as justiﬁed simply by pragmatic necessity.
You’re going to have to claw money back from the multitude because that’s where the money is.
That’s the only place where money is, because there’s no money left in the banks. (Sean)Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Community Appl. Soc. Psychol., 22: 453–469 (2012)
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should make personal sacriﬁces to resolve the economic situation. Representations of ordi-
nary people as morally responsible for suffering the recession’s consequences derive from
perceptions that they were involved in the processes that produced it: the activity patterns
perceived to have driven the recession (e.g. lending and borrowing practices) were ones in
which most of society participated. The general public was also faulted for failing to object
to questionable actions by the powerful.
We overspent in the Celtic Tiger, we spent too much money on our houses, on our cars, we went
on excessive holidays. (Aileen)
I suppose we’re all to blame, in the sense that we didn’t stand up and march. (Robert)
Ordinary people’s innocence. The above statements of ordinary people’s responsi-
bility were often accompanied by qualiﬁcations removing them from direct culpability.
While it was acknowledged that activity distributed throughout the population fuelled
the crisis, people were quick to note that this activity did not result from intentional deci-
sions on their part, thus mitigating their culpability. It was common for informants to
state that ordinary people had no control over the processes that led to the recession.
Their activity patterns were seen as determined by greater forces. In some cases, ordinary
people were portrayed as manipulated by more powerful agents to behave in ways that
suited their interests.
The banks were fuelling the need for property, for people to have properties, bigger and better
properties and multiple properties. (Paul)
They didn’t really have a choice whether to cause it or not, and now all of a sudden they have to
make up for it, something they probably didn’t decide to do in the ﬁrst place. (Anne)
In other cases, people were represented as subject to a type of mass hallucination or herd
mentality, rather than acting according to consciously thought-out decisions. People acted
thoughtlessly and without reﬂection on potential consequences — they ‘jumped on the
bandwagon’, ‘rolled with it’, ‘got sucked into the craze’. Representations of people’s
actions in these terms acknowledge that their behaviour played a part in causing the reces-
sion, but diminish their personal accountability for its consequences.
Ordinary people’s helplessness. A recurring thread through the data pointed to a feel-
ing of helplessness amongst the general population. Informants expressed a lack of conﬁ-
dence that action by ordinary people could have any signiﬁcant effect on the state of the
country.
People are helpless, they just kind of give up trying to change things and it’s almost feeling down-
trodden. (Caroline)
This low efﬁcacy in public sphere participation was often attributed to a lack of structures
through which effectual action was possible. It was not that people did not want to act, but that
they did not perceive anything in their environment offering a viable opportunity for action.
We didn’t stand up and march. . . but other than that what can an ordinary person do? We have
been disempowered by the system. (Robert)Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Community Appl. Soc. Psychol., 22: 453–469 (2012)
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Essentialist representations of humans and social groups. Also present in the data
was a sense that the recession was somewhat inevitable and unpreventable. Representa-
tions of intrapersonal life in deterministic ways contributed to this conviction. In dis-
cussing how the actions of ordinary people and the powerful built the situation from
which the recession emerged, people often recruited ideas of ‘human nature’. For ex-
ample, when asked to elaborate on the origins of the greed positioned as motivating
people’s actions, several represented it as a natural, inevitable aspect of the human
condition.
I think it’s innate in human nature. (Robert)
Representations of the essential ‘nature’ of the banking, political and business ﬁelds
were also recruited to understand the activities positioned as causing the recession. These
ﬁelds were seen as socialising their participants into dispositions of greed, selﬁshness and
deception. Such dispositions were represented as necessary ingredients for these ﬁelds to
function successfully.
That’s part of a good businessperson’s make-up. Never telling others the full story (. . .) And
if you take that right up the line, especially up towards people who are running banks, they
have obviously those traits in abundance. That’s how they’ve got on, that’s how to get on in
business. (Paul)
A further contributor towards the sense of fatalism derived from representations of the
‘Irish mentality’. The national character was represented as passive and accepting of dis-
empowerment, and this representation was used to explain the lack of objection to the
practices at the root of the crash.
I think a lot of it was in the Irish psyche, to be perfectly honest. (Tom)
Lay explanation of contemporary social crises 461Uncontrollable structural forces. Further reinforcing fatalistic views were certain
representations of wider structural factors over which individuals have no control. Many
informants mentioned the global nature of the recession. It was sometimes implied that
events within Ireland were irrelevant — no matter what happened internally, the outcome
would have been the same due to Ireland’s vulnerability to international economic
currents.
I think what happened was outside Ireland’s control. It was the fact that the world economy went
into recession that it hit us. It’s like if America sneezes, Ireland catches a cold. (Liam)
Also contributing to the sense of uncontrollability were representations of economic
phenomena as self-directed, autonomous forces that function independently of human
intentionality. Explanations of the recession in terms of ‘cycles’ or ‘spirals’ were common,
for example. Economic processes were represented as almost having an intentionality of
their own, divorced from any human agency.
Suddenly you had all this extra money ﬂying around the place (. . .) there was lots of money ﬂying
around the place and looking for homes. (Sean)Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Community Appl. Soc. Psychol., 22: 453–469 (2012)
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The interviews accessed a limited number and range of people. The qualitative data was
therefore supplemented with a survey to establish whether the patterns identiﬁed in the
interview data were present in a wider segment of the population.Method
Respondents. Survey respondents were recruited through advertisements placed on
several popular Irish websites and discussion boards in May–July 2010. The adverts
contained a web URL that linked directly to the survey. Efforts were made to post the
advert on a wide variety of websites. 138 people completed the survey. Of these, 50
(40%) were male, 74 (60%) female and 14 did not specify their gender. Of those who pro-
vided their age, 37% fell into the 16–25 age bracket, 42% into 26–35, 15% into 36–45, 5%
into 46–55 and 2% into 56–65. Using the National Statistics Socio-Economic Classiﬁca-
tion system (Ofﬁce for National Statistics, 2005), 9% were categorised as Managerial/
Professional, 34% as Intermediate and 13% as Routine/Manual, while 9% were unem-
ployed and 34% were students.
Procedure. The survey was presented online using the website www.surveygizmo.
com. The survey consisted of short descriptions of 20 possible causes of the recession
(see Table 2). On a 10-point Likert scale, respondents rated the importance of each in lead-
ing to the recession. The possible causes were based on statements made by informants
during the interviews; some were paraphrased to make for ‘neater’ survey items, but their
central meaning and language were retained. Finding the survey items within the qualita-
tive data ensured their validity, as the possible explanations were provided by community
members rather than created ‘from scratch’ by a researcher. Each item was presented on its
own page, such that each page contained a potential explanation for the recession (e.g.
‘Greed of individual bankers’) and a Likert scale with clearly labelled buttons from 0 to
10. To avoid any order effects, the survey programme randomised the sequence in which
the 20 items were presented.Results
Factor analysis. The 20 Likert items were subjected to Principal Components Analy-
sis using SPSS. The scree plot indicated a break after the fourth component, suggesting
that a four-factor solution was appropriate. This four-factor solution explained 54.74%
of the total variance. To aid in its interpretation, Varimax rotation was performed. The
rotated solution showed simple structure, with all factors displaying several strong load-
ings and all items loading substantially on one factor. According to convention, .3 was
taken as the threshold for an item to contribute to a factor. All item communalities
exceeded .3, with most over .5.
Factors 1, 2, 3 and 4 contributed 20.98%, 16.09%, 9.67% and 8% of the variance,
respectively. Table 1 displays the item loadings for the four factors. All items loading pri-
marily on Factor 1 implicate aspects of politics, banking and societal power in the reces-
sion’s causation. Factor 2 refers more to the general public and the features of ordinary
thought and behaviour perceived to have been involved in the processes leading to theCopyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Community Appl. Soc. Psychol., 22: 453–469 (2012)
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464 C. O’Connorrecession. Factor 3 seems to express the idea that the recession was a result of uncontrol-
lable economic factors and that Ireland’s recession was economically unavoidable. Factor
4, ﬁnally, suggests that things intrinsic to the Irish nation— its history and the character of
its people — were instrumental in the economic crash. These factors have been named
Power, Ordinary People, Economic Inevitability and Irish Nation, respectively.
Factor scores. Respondents’ factor scores were obtained by calculating the mean of
their responses to the items corresponding to each factor. The items corresponding to
Power were rated most important in causing the recession (M = 7.65, SD = 1.59), followed
by Ordinary People (M = 6.78, SD= 1.49), Economic Inevitability (M= 5.55, SD = 1.75)
and ﬁnally Irish Nation (M=4.69, SD=2.02). Figure 1 demonstrates these means. A one-
way repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to evaluate the difference between
these means. Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity was violated,
w2(5) = 21.12, p< .01. Degrees of freedom were therefore corrected with Huynh-Feldt esti-
mates of sphericity (e = .943). Results indicated a signiﬁcant difference between the factor
scores, F(2.8, 387.4) = 97.274, p< .001. Post-hoc t-tests with Bonferroni corrections revealed
that all four factor scores differed signiﬁcantly from each other. Statistical analysis demon-
strated no effect of sex, age or socio-economic status on factor scores.Figure 1. Means of factor scores.OVERALL RESULTS
The content of the factors extracted from the survey data corresponds closely with the themes
identiﬁed in the interview data. Power and Ordinary People materialise as key underlying
dimensions in both data sets. The survey factors of Economic Inevitability and Irish
Nation, meanwhile, comprise two important threads of the qualitative theme of Fatalism.
Naturally, overlap in the results from the two data sources is to be expected as the survey
items were derived from the interview data. The triangulation of interest, however, is not of
the speciﬁc ideas, but of the relationships between them. For example, the areas of banking,
politics and power were highly interlinked both quantitatively and qualitatively. This
promotes conﬁdence that the themes identiﬁed in the thematic analysis represent cohesive
explanatory frameworks. Thus, power, ordinary people and fatalism appear to be the key
orienting points undergirding lay explanations of the recession.Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Community Appl. Soc. Psychol., 22: 453–469 (2012)
DOI: 10.1002/casp
Lay explanation of contemporary social crises 465DISCUSSION
This study suggested that three major themes organised lay explanations of Ireland’s reces-
sion. Most salient was a projection of blame towards the powerful in society. This inter-
acted dynamically with representations of ordinary people’s role in the processes leading
to the recession: ordinary people were acknowledged to hold some responsibility, though
people held back from investing this with full moral culpability. Also observable were
representations of the recession in fatalistic terms, giving causal signiﬁcance to features
of the world that transcend any individual, and over which no control is possible.Power and ordinary people: anchoring, objectiﬁcation and identity dynamics
The anchoring, objectiﬁcation and identity protection functions of social representation
were apparent in the themes of Power and Ordinary People. Power emerged as a major
anchor for social representations of the recession. Explanations of the crisis were grounded
in perceptions of how power operates and in the individuals and groups designated as pow-
erful. In the wake of the recession, quite a clear idea of who was responsible had solidiﬁed,
objectiﬁed in the banker-politician-developer ‘triad’. This objectiﬁcation was emotionally
and symbolically loaded and seemed to provide a solid focus for the narrative of the reces-
sion as reﬂecting power’s recklessness with the lives of ordinary people.
The direction of blame towards the powerful can be interpreted as an instance of ‘other-
ing’. Traditionally research has identiﬁed low-status, stigmatised outgroups (such as immi-
grants, homosexuals or poor people) as the focus for ‘othering’ (Joffe, 1999). It is
interesting that in the present research people located their ‘other’ by looking up rather than
down the social strata. This may partly be an exercise of defensive attribution, motivated
by people trying to remove culpability from themselves. This should not however delegi-
timize this explanatory position; the data shows that people also implicated themselves and
other ‘ordinary people’. The presence of ‘othering’ implies identity dynamics that position
the powerful as sharply separate from the general population. The elite were represented as
disconnected from the public’s concerns, resulting in public alienation from the powerful
and the systems they represent. The political and economic establishments did not just fail
to inspire automatic trust in the public, but elicited active mistrust. Estrangement of the
general population from institutional powers was both reﬂected in and reinforced by the
representations of the recession that emerged.Risk society, reﬂexivity and fatalism
A key advantage of SRT is that in exploring representations of one particular issue, it also
furnishes an insight into the texture of life in that society more generally. The shift in the
direction of ‘othering’ processes is interesting in this regard, as it is possible that it may
indicate social changes ushered in by the risk society. Beck (1992) claims that the risk so-
ciety encourages a culture of reﬂexivity, in which ever-present future threat requires rou-
tine contemplation of counterfactual scenarios and scrutiny of present circumstances in
light of this. This chimes with the work of Giddens (1991), who depicts the late 20th
century as a time characterised by the institutionalisation of ‘radical doubt’ and the end
of automatic deference to authority. These changes do not augur well for traditional insti-
tutional powers, whose pronouncements and decisions no longer go uncontested.Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Community Appl. Soc. Psychol., 22: 453–469 (2012)
DOI: 10.1002/casp
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pillars of Irish society (such as the Catholic Church) become tenuous. The current data may
reﬂect an historical context in which people are increasingly ready to ‘other’ society’s
powerful strata in orientations towards social problems.
Beck and Giddens are optimistic about the transformative power of reﬂexivity, portray-
ing it as a means through which people can change social conditions. It is implied that if
traditional politics is not sufﬁciently responsive to the demands of the risk society, the
resource of reﬂexivity enables people to transfer their political engagement to the domain
of life politics or sub-politics (Beck, 1999; Giddens, 1991). Beck and Beck-Gernsheim
(2001) describe life politics as the forging of links between private actions that have little
meaning by themselves and outcomes in which individuals feel themselves agents of
global political acts. The present data, however, revealed little evidence of such political
efﬁcacy. The sense that people felt helpless and disempowered in their socio-political
environment emerged very strongly. Informants recognised, in retrospect, that their actions
helped fuel the situation from which the recession developed. They felt, however, that
there was nothing they could have done to change the situation in the past, and that there
were few ways they could address it in the present. People expressed frustration that power
was concentrated in the hands of small, distrusted sectors of society, but lacked the energy
or collective efﬁcacy needed to wrest it back. Indeed, they seemed to feel that there was no
way in which this could be done, stating that they did not perceive any structures through
which ordinary people could meaningfully participate in public life. Respondents did not
experience any space — political or sub-political— in which they could satisfactorily act.
This suggests that at the level of actual lived experience, the reﬂexivity introduced by
the risk society may not necessarily be a genuinely empowering resource if opportunity
for discursive critique of authority is not matched by opportunity to act on this critique.
The old institutional powers were perceived to retain considerable hold over the pathways
through which tangible change can be effected. A combination of intense criticism and an
inability to channel that into action appeared to result in an atmosphere of bitter resentment
mixed with resignation to a disempowered state. The sense of fatalism present in the data
links into this feeling of helplessness. In the interviews, people persistently represented
themselves as powerless beneath the force of economic currents, international affairs,
human nature, national character. Fatalistic responses to public crises could speculatively
have far-reaching social effects: implying there is no blame to be apportioned, suggesting
nothing can prevent a reoccurrence, justifying the crisis as part of the natural order of
things and undermining belief in the power of human agency in structuring our world.The complexity of lay explanation
The breadth of representation encompassed in the data is striking. That people did not have
an extensive repertoire of economic knowledge at their disposal did not inhibit the con-
struction of complex explanations for the crisis. Instead of recruiting formal economic con-
cepts, people found material for explanation in their social world, drawing upon a wide
range of ideas about society, power, morality, public spheres and personhood. The reces-
sion was not conceptually ‘lifted out’ of its social environment to be understood as a
distinct, strictly economic event: for most people, the recession was not a strictly economic
event. The representations circulating deﬁned the core of the recession as political, social
and moral; it was perceived to epitomise ‘what was wrong’ in Ireland.Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Community Appl. Soc. Psychol., 22: 453–469 (2012)
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Lay explanation of contemporary social crises 467Both explanatory types identiﬁed by Leiser et al. (2010)— understandings of the ﬁnan-
cial crisis focused on the individual and those directed at the systemic level— appeared in
the current data. As in that study, moralisation of the crisis by focusing on individuals’
moral or cognitive failings was the most salient feature of people’s explanatory efforts.
Interestingly, however, the clear division between these types that Leiser et al. (2010)
found did not materialise in either the qualitative or quantitative portions of this study.
Rather, the themes that emerged were holistic ones that combined multiple levels of expla-
nation: Power, for instance, contained references both to personal characteristics of pow-
erful individuals and to an institutional structure that concentrates power in their hands.
When power was recruited in understanding the recession, both these dispositional and
structural dimensions were simultaneously implicated.
This difference from Leiser et al.’s (2010) results could reﬂect differences in the
research ﬁelds. Ireland was particularly sharply affected by the recession, and the economy
was paramount in the public agenda at the time of data collection. It is possible that the
importance of an issue in a society mediates the level of complexity of the explanations
that develop. It is interesting to note that the explanations respondents offered for the reces-
sion were not entirely internally coherent: contradictions were evident, both between and
within individuals. The projection of responsibility onto the powerful was reined in by
acknowledgement that ordinary people also were implicated, which was then qualiﬁed
by summoning factors mitigating the moral culpability of their actions. This was simulta-
neously accompanied by representations of the recession as inevitable and uncontrollable,
implying that the apportioning of blame is a futile endeavour. Rather than signalling deﬁ-
ciencies or inaccuracies, such states of representational tension may indicate genuine psy-
chological engagement with the issue: people are investing cognitive energy in reﬂecting
on the issue’s different dimensions rather than quickly arriving at simple one-dimensional
explanations.Limitations and future directions
The picture of public thinking provided by the current data corpus is not conclusive or
comprehensive. The interviews were limited in number and accessed a restricted range
of the population. The survey also was subject to sampling problems, yielding a relatively
small sample size in which females, students and younger people were over-represented.
This may be particularly important given that students and young people are likely to have
limited experience of ﬁnance and the labour market relative to the rest of the population.
SRT suggests that representations are intimately linked to the groups present in a society:
if different groups possess different concerns or projects, this will be reﬂected in differ-
ences in the representations they carry (Bauer & Gaskell, 1999). The current study did
not provide for any systematic comparison between the different groups that segment
the wider Irish population. It would be interesting, for example, to investigate how the
representations maintained by members of the banker-politician-developer ‘triad’ may dif-
fer from those uncovered in the present data. There are likely to be many aspects of the
representations of the recession circulating in Irish society that the present research did
not detect. Nevertheless, the clear patterns into which both the quantitative and qualitative
data fell give some grounds for conﬁdence that those it did identify are meaningful ones.
It should be clear that this study captured a snapshot of Irish public thinking at one spe-
ciﬁc historical moment. It does not claim to provide a depiction of representation in IrelandCopyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Community Appl. Soc. Psychol., 22: 453–469 (2012)
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ded in their social context and change as that context does (Jovchelovitch, 2002). The Irish
societal context has indeed changed considerably since the time of research: the following
months saw further economic decline, recourse to extensive emergency loans from the
European Union and International Monetary Fund, and a change of government. Undoubt-
edly, social representations and public sentiment have evolved alongside such events.
While the particular content of the representations may have changed, however, the data
illuminates aspects of the lay explanation process that are likely to persist. The central
point is that issues emanating from abstract, expert-dominated domains like economics
are made meaningful by grounding them in their social, political and moral context: these
dimensions of human experience supply the material on which explanations are built. The
anchoring of the recession in ideas of ‘power’ versus ‘ordinary people’ gave it a narrative
while the objectiﬁcation of the ‘triad’ provided a solid focus. It was the process of social
representation that facilitated the saturation of the crisis with such meaning, and thus it
was social representation that grounded abstract economic processes in issues relevant to
people’s direct experience of the social world. It is anticipated that in the coming years,
risk society-type issues will increasingly dominate the societal agenda. If this is the case,
it is important that how people respond to these issues is adequately understood and
theorised. SRT appears ideally placed to examine how explanations for such issues are
constructed, and it is recommended that future research on responses to public crises adopt
SRT as a primary theoretical point of reference.ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The author would like to thank Dr. Sandra Jovchelovitch and Dr. Helene Joffe for
their advice at various stages of this research and two anonymous reviewers for their
constructive comments.REFERENCES
Bauer, M. W. (2009). The evolution of public understanding of science - discourse and comparative
evidence. Science, Technology & Society, 14, 221–240.
Bauer, M., & Gaskell, G. (1999). Towards a paradigm for research on social representations. Journal
for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 29, 163–186.
Beck, U. (1992). Risk society: Towards a new modernity. London: Sage.
Beck, U. (1999). World Risk Society. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Beck, U., & Beck-Gernsheim, E. (2001). Individualization. London: Sage.
Bonn, M., Earle, D., Lea, S., &Webley, P. (1999). South African children’s views of wealth, pov-
erty, inequality and unemployment. Journal of Economic Psychology, 20, 593–612.
Braun, V., & Clarke, V. (2006). Using thematic analysis in psychology. Qualitative Research in Psy-
chology, 3, 77–101.
CSOI (Central Statistics Ofﬁce Ireland). (2010). Seasonally Adjusted Standardised Unemployment
Rates. Retrieved August 5, 2010, from http://www.cso.ie/statistics/sasunemprates.htm
Försterling, F. (2001). Attribution: An introduction to theories, research and applications. Hove:
Psychology Press.
Gaskell, G. (2000). Individual and group interviewing. In M. W. Bauer, & G. Gaskell (Eds.), Qual-
itative researching with text, image and sound: A practical handbook (pp. 38–56). London: Sage.
Giddens, A. (1991).Modernity and self-identity: Self and society in the late modern age. Cambridge:
Polity Press.Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Community Appl. Soc. Psychol., 22: 453–469 (2012)
DOI: 10.1002/casp
Lay explanation of contemporary social crises 469Hewstone, M. (1989). Causal attribution: From cognitive processes to collective beliefs. Oxford:
Basil Blackwell.
Howarth, C. (2002). Identity in whose eyes?: The role of representations in identity construction.
Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 32, 145–162.
Hume, D. (2007). A treatise of human nature. In D. F. Norton, & M. J. Norton (Eds.). Oxford:
Oxford University Press. (Original work published 1740).
Ichheiser, G. (1949). Misunderstandings in human relations: A study in false social perception. The
American Journal of Sociology, 55, 1–70.
Jodelet, D. (1991). Madness and social representations: Living with the mad in one French commu-
nity. (T. Pownall, Trans.). Los Angeles: University of California Press.
Joffe, H. (1999). Risk and ‘the other’. Cambridge: University Press.
Joffe, H. (2003). Risk: From perception to social representation. British Journal of Social Psy-
chology, 42, 55–73.
Joffe, H., & Haarhoff, G. (2002). Representations of far-ﬂung illnesses: The case of Ebola in Britain.
Social Science & Medicine, 54, 955–969.
Joffe, H., Washer, P., & Solberg, C. (2011). Public engagement with emerging infectious disease:
The case of MRSA in Britain. Psychology & Health, 21, 1–17.
Jovchelovitch, S. (2002). Re-thinking the diversity of knowledge: Cognitive polyphasia, belief and
representation. Psychologie et Société, 5, 121–138.
Jovchelovitch, S. (2007). Knowledge in context: Representations, community and culture. London:
Routledge.
Jovchelovitch, S. (2008). The rehabilitation of common sense: Social representations, science and
cognitive polyphasia. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 38, 431–448.
Kelly, M. (2010). Whatever happened to Ireland? Centre for Economic Policy Research Discussion
Paper No. DP7811. Retrieved August 5, 2010, from http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1611507
Leiser, D., & Drori, S. (2005). Naive understanding of inﬂation. Journal of Socio-Economics, 34,
179–198.
Leiser, D., Bourgeois-Gironde, S., & Benita, R. (2010). Human foibles or systemic failure - Lay per-
ceptions of the 2008–2009 ﬁnancial crisis. Journal of Socio-Economics, 39, 132–141.
Moscovici, S. (1988). Notes towards a description of Social Representations. European Journal of
Social Psychology, 18, 211–250.
Moscovici, S. (2008). Psychoanalysis: Its image and its public. (D. Macey, Trans.). Cambridge: Pol-
ity Press. (Original work published 1961).
Ofﬁce for National Statistics. (2005). The National Statistics Socio-Economic Classiﬁcation User
Manual. Retrieved July 28, 2010, from http://www.statistics.gov.uk/methods_quality/ns_sec/
downloads/NS-SEC_User_2005.pdf
Roland-Lévy, C., Pappalardo Boumelki, F.-E., & Guillet, E. (2010). Representation of the ﬁnancial
crisis: Effect on social representations of savings and credit. Journal of Socio-Economics, 39,
142–149.
Sévon, G., & Weckström, S. (1989). The development of reasoning about economic events: A study
of Finnish children. Journal of Economic Psychology, 10, 495–514.
Wagner, W., & Kronberger, N. (2001). Killer tomatoes! Collective symbolic coping with biotechnol-
ogy. In K. Deaux, & G. Philogene (Eds.), Representations of the social - bridging theoretical tra-
ditions (pp. 147–164). Oxford: Blackwell.Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Community Appl. Soc. Psychol., 22: 453–469 (2012)
DOI: 10.1002/casp
